



A New Look into Fiscal Counter-cyclicality: 







This paper empirically revisits the debate surrounding the role of fiscal policy in dampening 
output fluctuations. We provide a positive analysis of fiscal stabilizers in general and automatic 
stabilizers in particular by focusing on a heterogenous sample of 84 countries between 1980 
and 2015. We add to the existing literature by: i) explicitly assessing fiscal counter-cyclicality 
across the different states of the business cycle; ii) allowing for expectations about future fiscal 
outcomes to play a role; iii) differentiating between the counter-cyclical fiscal effects from 
demand and supply shocks. Our results show that that fiscal counter-cyclicality is sizeable 
across the world, particularly during periods of economic slack. While the degree of counter-
cyclicality is larger in Advanced Economies relative to Emerging and Low-Income Countries, 
there is higher heterogeneity within than between country groups. Accounting for future 
expectations about the dynamics of the fiscal stance enhances the degree of fiscal counter-
cyclicality. Automatic stabilizers are an important component of the overall fiscal counter-
cyclicality. The fiscal response to demand shocks is higher compared to supply shocks. 
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1. Introduction  
The Global Financial Crisis and its legacies have put fiscal policy at the center of the debate 
about the policy mix required to help steering economies towards a stable growth path. In 
addition to the allocation and distribution roles, fiscal policy is also responsible for the 
macroeconomic stabilization against business cycle fluctuations (Musgrave, 1956/57; 1959). 
Pressing policy challenges have revived the debate on the effectiveness of fiscal policy as a 
stabilizer (van der Ploeg, 2005; Botman et al., 2006).1 A growing number of countries turned 
to fiscal policy as their primary stabilization instrument either because of changes in their 
monetary regime (currency board, hard peg, participation in a monetary union) or because 
financial conditions deteriorated to the point of making monetary policy ineffective 
(Spilimbergo et al., 2008). As economic conditions normalize, policymakers will expect to rely 
on fiscal stabilizers to safeguard against short-term setbacks and dampen future volatility, 
which in turn is known to negatively affect medium-term growth (Ramey and Ramey, 1995).2  
The stabilization of business cycle fluctuations through fiscal policy measures can work 
through three different channels. The first refers the role played by automatic stabilizers, by 
smoothing economic activity directly through the automatic response via taxes and the transfer 
system. More precisely, by lessening the effects of the liquidity constraints faced by 
households and alleviating the impact of exogenous shocks to aggregate income on aggregate 
current consumption and output.3 There is, however, a second indirect channel which is related 
to government expenditures that remain fixed independent of the stage of the cycle and that by 
not responding to it also have, indirectly, a stabilizing function. The third is the use of 
discretionary fiscal policy actions even though the majority of the empirical literature suggests 
a pro-cyclical bias of these measures and, therefore, a destabilizing effect (van den Noord, 
2000; Golinelli and Momigliano, 2009).  
While the Great Recession highlighted the importance of discretionary actions when large 
and persistent shocks occur, the consensus remains that automatic stabilizers have a key role 
to play under normal conditions (Blanchard et al., 2010). Against this backdrop, the debate on 
efficient shock-absorption mechanisms has not only moved to the highest policy circles in the 
 
1 This stabilization goal can be thought as a “residual” since it is only a byproduct of choices concerning the size, 
the structure and the government financing that are dictated by either efficiency or distributive considerations. 
2 The argument relates to skill losses due to unemployment in recessions with negative effects on productivity 
and medium-term growth (Martin and Rogers, 1997); a second argument rests on the observation that growth is 
usually low in periods of political instability (Alesina et al., 1992); a third one relates to credit market 
imperfections (Stiglitz, 1994); the most common argument stresses the importance of uncertainty for investment 
(Dixit and Pyndic, 1994). 
3 Fiscal stabilizers reduce output fluctuations because some components of fiscal accounts react automatically to 
the cycle, increasing public deficits in recessions and decreasing them in expansions. In recessions fewer taxes 
are collected and more unemployment benefits are paid both of which support incomes. However, in a boom the 





last few years4, but has also shifted its center from discretionary fiscal policy to how to improve 
(automatic) fiscal stabilizers. Moreover, most recent studies delved into the short-to-medium 
term impact of discretionary fiscal actions as measured by “fiscal multipliers”. Relatively little 
attention has been paid, surprisingly, to the “silent” work (and effectiveness) of fiscal 
stabilizers. In face of increasing restraints (either for sustainability reasons, fiscal space 
limitations, financial market pressures, or fiscal frameworks in place – e.g. fiscal rules), 
discretionary fiscal policies face with regard to their stabilizing function5, this re-focusing 
seems rightly justified. Automatic stabilizers, in contrast, by operating in real time, do not 
suffer from the information, decision and implementation lags that impair the effectiveness of 
discretionary actions.6 Moreover, they are not subjected to the risk that political and other 
factors prevent a timely retrenchment in good times (Baunsgaard and Symansky, 2009). 
Several empirical studies recognize the difficulties in providing accurate estimates of the 
exact degree of fiscal counter-cyclicality. However, they also acknowledge the need to have at 
least approximations of it (Cotis et al. (1997) and Auerbach and Feenberg (2000)). With this 
in mind, this paper contributes to this debate with a positive analysis of fiscal counter-
cyclicality in general and automatic stabilizers in particular. We focus on a broad and 
heterogenous sample of 84 countries with diverse characteristics between 1980 and 2015 and 
employ a variety of panel and time series techniques to estimate the degree of fiscal counter-
cyclicality and its sub-components (the automatic one and the “discretionary” one). The 
empirical analysis of fiscal counter-cyclicality in emerging markets and low-income countries 
will cover ground that has not been widely examined in a coherent and consistent fashion. 
More importantly, we add to the existing literature by: i) explicitly assessing fiscal counter-
cyclicality across the different states of the business cycle; ii) allowing for expectations about 
future fiscal outcomes to play a role; iii) differentiating between the counter-cyclical fiscal 
effects from demand and supply shocks. 
Our results show that in advanced economies, fiscal counter-cyclicality has been the norm. 
In several emerging markets and low-income countries, on the other hand, fiscal policy has not 
always been counter-cyclical. We also found that automatic stabilizers play a very important 
role in fiscal counter-cyclicality, despite substantial differences between countries. Moreover, 
 
4 See, for example, the European Commission “Blueprint” or the Report of the President of the European Council 
for a “Genuine Economic and Monetary Union”. 
5 In Europe, the Stability and Growth Pack requires member state governments to avoid excessive deficits and to 
achieve a medium-term-objective compatible with long-term fiscal sustainability. Moreover, the new “Fiscal 
Pact” goes even further and sets a legally binding maximum structural deficit of 0.5 percent of GDP. This leaves 
little room for counter-cyclical discretionary fiscal policy. Recently this dilemma has been aggravated by the 
woes of the sovereign debt crisis since insolvency fears have further limited governments’ room for 
countercyclical fiscal manoeuvre. Even worse, in the recent crisis many countries were forced to cut expenditures 
or increase taxes in the downturn, i.e. to act pro-cyclically, to restore market confidence. This said, the primary 
goals of discretionary fiscal policy are income distribution and resource allocation, not stabilization.  
6 Tax and expenditure changes have traditionally to go through lengthy parliamentary decision-making processes 





fiscal policy is most effective to stabilize output during recessions. In contrast, it is generally 
not used to mitigate economic booms. Furthermore, taking into account fiscal expectations 
increases the overall stabilizing effect of fiscal policy. Finally, the sensitivity of the budget 
balance is always higher in face of demand shocks. 
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 outlines the conceptual and 
methodological framework. Section 3 presents the data and the main empirical results. Section 
4 provides further discussions. The last section concludes. 
2. Conceptual and Methodological framework 
2.1 Measuring fiscal counter-cyclicality in a static setting 
Quantifying the stabilizing effect of fiscal policy requires assessing how fiscal policy 
affects economic activity. In a static setting, the empirical approach to measure the 
contribution “on impact” of fiscal policy to aggregate stability involves the estimation of the 
response of relevant fiscal aggregate to changes in output (Lane, 2002; Fatás and Mihov, 
2012).7 The overall stabilizing role of fiscal policy is conceptually equivalent to the estimated 
sensitivity (or cyclicality) of a broad indicator of fiscal policy. On the one hand, the more 
countercyclical government spending is, the higher the fiscal counter-cyclicality —a relatively 
high level of government spending when private demand is low will stabilize aggregate 
demand. On the other, the more progressive taxes are, the higher the fiscal counter-cyclicality 
—if taxes fall more than output, when output falls, then taxes help stabilizing disposable 
income. One good candidate variable is the budget balance (BB) (expressed in percent of GDP) 
which is an appropriate proxy for the aggregate demand’s effect of fiscal policy in a given year 
(Blanchard, 1993).8 That is, 
 𝐵𝐵 = 𝛼 + 𝛽𝐵𝐵 ∙ 𝑔𝑟𝑜𝑤𝑡ℎ + 𝜀,   (1) 
where growth is real GDP growth and 𝛽𝐵𝐵 captures the degree of overall fiscal counter-
cyclicality. 𝜀 is a white noise disturbance satisfying usual assumptions of zero mean and 
constant variance. 
When evaluating the counter-cyclical role of fiscal policy, a natural question is how 
much of the overall fiscal counter-cyclicality comes from the structural part of the budget and 
how much comes from automatic changes that are the result of the tax code and spending laws. 
In practice, answering this question requires decomposing the budget balance into a structural 
 
7 The effectiveness of fiscal stabilizers depends on how much disposable income influences consumption and 
investment. This behavior entails the failure of the Ricardian proposition. If it held perfectly, there would be no 
room for fiscal stabilization since the private sector would provide all the needed stabilization through saving 
decisions. However, saving behavior can be destabilizing in some cases (Christiano, 1984). 
8 In practice, the effectiveness of fiscal policy on aggregate demand and its effect in dampening volatility depends 





(cyclically adjusted) part and into an automatic part, and, consequently, assessing how these 
two components react to changes in economic activity.9 The average stabilizing contribution 
of non-automatic or “discretionary” fiscal actions can be identified by the sensitivity of the 
cyclically-adjusted balance (CAB) (expressed in percent of GDP). Moreover, the difference 
between the overall sensitivity and that stemming from the CAB can be attributed to automatic 
stabilizers (AS). In mathematical form: 
 
 𝐶𝐴𝐵 = 𝛼 + 𝛽𝐶𝐴𝐵 ∙ 𝑔𝑟𝑜𝑤𝑡ℎ + 𝜀,   (2) 
 𝛽𝐴𝑆 = 𝛽𝐵𝐵 − 𝛽𝐶𝐴𝐵   (3) 
where 𝛽𝐶𝐴𝐵, 𝛽𝐴𝑆 capture the degree of the counter-cyclicality attributable to “discretionary” 
fiscal actions and that attributable to the action of automatic stabilizers, respectively. 𝜀 is a 
white noise disturbance satisfying usual assumptions of zero mean and constant variance.  
Fiscal stabilizers may not work or may actually increase output fluctuations if there are 
perverse effects associated with their functioning. Perverse effects may occur, for instance, if 
fiscal deficits during recessions give rise to increases in long-term interest rates due to high 
public debt risk or sustainability concerns and future increased taxation. In this case, private 
consumption and investment may actually decrease during recessions as a consequence of 
fiscal counter-cyclicality and, therefore, increase the depth of recessions (van den Noord, 2002; 
IMF, 2015 and Furceri and Jalles, 2018). Looking at how fiscal stabilizers behave during 
economic upturns and downturns can provide useful information since their behavior need not 
have to be symmetric.   
 
To explore whether fiscal counter-cyclicality varies depending on the phase of the 
business cycle, we follow the approach proposed by Auerbach and Gorodnichenko (2012) to 
assess the magnitude of fiscal multipliers in expansions and recessions. This approach is 
equivalent to Granger and Teravistra’s (1993) smooth transition autoregressive (STAR) model. 
More specifically, we estimate: 
 
  𝐵𝐵 = 𝛼 + 𝛽𝑅 ∙ 𝑔𝑟𝑜𝑤𝑡ℎ 𝐺(𝑧) + 𝛽𝐸 ∙ 𝑔𝑟𝑜𝑤𝑡ℎ (1 − 𝐺(𝑧)) + 𝜀 , (4) 
with 𝐺(𝑧𝑖𝑡) = [
exp(−𝛾𝑧𝑖𝑡)
1+exp(−𝛾𝑧𝑖𝑡)
] , 𝛾 > 0, where z is a normalized indicator (with zero mean and 
unit variance) of the state of the economy – our analysis uses contemporaneous real GDP 
 
9 When looking at the cyclical properties of the budget balance, it is common to split it  into the cyclical balance 
and the cyclically-adjusted balance (Galí and Perotti, 2003). Changes in the cyclical balance give an estimate of 
the budgetary impact of aggregate fluctuations through the induced changes in tax bases and certain mandatory 





growth as a measure of the state of the economy. 10 𝛽𝑅 denotes the fiscal counter-cyclicality 
coefficient during recessions while 𝛽𝐸 captures the same during expansions. Following 
Auerbach and Gorodnichenko (2012), the value of 𝛾 is set to be equal to 1.5 to mimic the 
business cycle properties of many advanced economies—that is, we assume that each economy 
spends about 80 percent of the time in expansion and 20 percent in recession.11 The main 
advantage of this approach relative to estimating SVARs for each regime is that it considers a 
larger number of observations to compute the effect of interest, thus improving the stability 
and precision of the coefficient estimates.12 
 
2.2 The role of expectations in assessing fiscal counter-cyclicality 
In a dynamic setting, measuring the impact of fiscal policy on aggregate demand 
requires looking not only at the current budget balance but also at future anticipated deficits 
and at the level of the stock of public debt (Blanchard, 1985). Therefore, assessing the 
magnitude of overall fiscal counter-cyclicality, requires examining how future anticipated 
deficits respond to changes in economic activity today. In the extreme case of the Ricardian 
equivalence, the expectation of higher future surpluses fully offsets the impact of an increase 
in the present deficit. Following Blanchard and Summers (1984), consider a highly stylized 
life-cycle model linking private consumption to wealth: 
 
 𝐶 = ω[𝐾 + 𝐵 + π(𝑊 − 𝑇;  𝑟 + 𝑝)]  (5) 
where C is private consumption, K + B represent financial wealth (B is the stock of government 
bonds), ω is the marginal propensity to consume out of wealth, and the function 
π(𝑊 − 𝑇;  𝑟 + 𝑝) defines the present value of after-tax labor income 𝑊 − 𝑇 using a discount 
rate 𝑟 + 𝑝. The term r is the real interest rate, while p captures the mortality of current 
consumers or their short-sightedness about the future (myopic coefficient).13 That wedge 
between the real interest rate and the subjective discount rate breaks the Ricardian equivalence. 
The part of aggregate demand depending directly on fiscal policy can now be defined as X: 
 𝑋 = ω[𝐵 + π(𝐷;  𝑟 + 𝑝)] + [𝐺 − ωπ(𝐺; 𝑟 + 𝑝)] (6) 
 
10 Similar results are obtained, using lagged real GDP growth or a (new) measure of the output gap (see section 
3.1 for details and the discussion in section 4). 
11 Results are robust to different parameterizations. 
12 A similar strategy has been applied in other contexts to model non-linearities. For example, in the context of 
exchange rates dynamics (Sarrno and Taylor, 2002) or sectoral performance during the business cycle (Fok et 
al., 2005) or money demand (Chen and Wu, 2005). 
13 Blanchard (1985) presents an extended version of this model, in which agents have finite horizons. Weil (1989) 
develops a model in which new and infinitely-linked dynasties continuously enter the economy over time and 
where Ricardian neutrality does not hold because of population growth. Buiter (1988) combines these two models 
to show that debt neutrality holds if and only if the sum of the rate of growth of population and the individual 





where G is government spending, and D denotes primary budget deficits. The first term of 
equation (5) translates the effect of debt and government finance on aggregate demand; the 
second term, captures the effect of government spending that is financed by current taxes. If 
consumers are not myopic (that is, p = 0), the first term of equation (5) equals 0, because 
consumers anticipate fully the fiscal implications of the government’s budget constraint 
(Ricardian equivalence).14 If consumers are myopic (p>0), however, then the first term is 
positive, since their estimated life-time income will not incorporate the higher taxes needed to 
service higher future public debt. Assuming a value for 𝜔 equal to 0.115 and a value of 𝑟 + 𝑝 −
𝑔 equal to 7 percent a year,16 an empirical approximation of X can be rewritten as: 
 𝑥𝑡 = 0.1[𝑏𝑡 + ∑ (1.07)
−𝑖𝑝𝑑𝑡,𝑡+𝑖
∞
𝑖=0 ], (7) 
where 𝑏𝑡 is the stock of public debt at time t, and 𝑝𝑑𝑡,𝑡+𝑖 is the forecast of primary deficits at 
time t for the period t+i. Expected deficits are constructed using IMF-WEO fiscal forecasts. 
These forecasts are available from 1990 onwards, and they should, at least to a certain extent, 
reflect changes in current policies, as well as forecasts of output growth and the evolution of 
debt and interest payments over time. Note that since forecasts are available only for a time 
horizon of five years, the ratio of deficits to GDP for year t+i>5 is assumed to be equal to the 
ratio forecast for year t+5.17 
 
2.3 Demand versus supply shocks 
 
From a positive point of view, it is irrelevant whether the budget balance responds to 
changes in economic activity that are cyclical or persistent (and, therefore, requiring taking a 
stand on what the output gap is, or on what is the desirable (long-run) level of output). 
However, from a normative point of view it is important that the budget balance responds to 
changes in economic activity that are demand driven and that tend to be cyclical. The 
conventional wisdom is that a timely countercyclical response of fiscal policy to demand 
shocks is likely to deliver considerably lower output and consumption volatility (Kumhof and 
Laxton, 2009). However, well-intended fiscal activism can also be undesirable or destabilizing 
 
14 If consumers discount future taxes at the real interest rate, the timing of a change in taxes does not affect their 
level of spending. Indeed, the government intertemporal budget constraint translates into 𝐵 + π(𝐷;  𝑟) = 0, that 
is, the net present value of future primary surpluses equals to the current public debt.  
15 As shown in Arrondel et al. (2015), micro-based simulations for France, for instance, point to an estimate of 
about 0.01 for the whole population, meaning that one additional euro of net wealth would be associated with 1 
cent of euro of additional annual consumption; macro-based estimates range from 0.8 of a cent to 1 cent on annual 
consumption for every 1 euro increase. See also Slacalek (2009). 
16 The values r+p-g are based on Hayashi’s (1982) estimates. Given the decline in real interest rates over the last 
two decades (in the context of the Great Moderation period and since the Global Financial Crisis) , the value of 
0.07 we choose is smaller than the one proposed by Blanchard and Summers (1984) b ut this paper was 35 years 
ago and interest rates (and inflation) were much higher back then. Although choosing a different value would 
affect the level of the index, it would not affect its evolution, which is the main interest in this analysis.  





when shocks are predominantly affecting the supply side (Blanchard, 2000). In other words, 
the fiscal policy response triggered by automatic stabilizers can also end up being destabilizing 
if, for instance, variations in economic activity reflect supply conditions.18 
Assessing the sensitivity of counter-cyclical coefficients to different types of shocks is 
hindered by the difficulty in identifying the nature of such shocks and any formal analysis of 
the issue is bound to be tentative. One approach is to identify pure “demand” disturbances 
using the method of Blanchard and Quah (1989), whose underlying assumption is that “supply” 
disturbances permanently affect output. Another approach is simply to differentiate between 
the sensitivity of the fiscal balance to changes in the output gap or changes in real GDP growth.  
 
3. Data and Empirical Results 
3.1 Data  
In this paper we use a heterogeneous panel of 84 countries split between 32 advanced 
economies (AE), 26 emerging market economies (EME) and 26 low-income countries (LIC). 
Data for all variables of interest are collected on an annual basis from 1980-2015. The sources 
of data are IMF’s International Financial Statistics and IMF’s World Economic Outlook. The 
variables used in this paper comprise of: the budget balance (in percent of GDP), real GDP (in 
national currency), fiscal forecasts, total government expenditures, total government revenues. 
In order to estimate equation 2 (and then obtain 3)), we are required to have an estimate of 
the cyclically adjusted budget balance. We refrain from relying on IMF’s WEO measure of the 
output gap to this effect for a few reasons. First, despite substantial progress in the estimation 
methodologies to calculate potential output, there is still not a widely accepted approach in the 
profession. According to Borio (2013), researchers adopt two alternative approaches to 
estimate potential GDP: i) there are univariate statistical approaches, which usually consist of 
filtering out the trend component from the cyclical one; ii) there are the structural approaches, 
which derive the estimates directly from the theoretical structure of a model. Aware of the 
shortcomings of using either one or the other19, and at the cost of not maximizing the total 
number of observations in our panel dataset, instead of relying on the IMF’s WEO measure of 
output gap20, we rather apply the recent filtering technique developed by Hamilton (20187). 
We do so since we are aware of the criticisms surrounding, for instance, the use of the Hodrick-
Prescott (HP) filter (such as the identification of spurious cycles, inter alia), particularly in the 
 
18 An example of an adverse shock not warranting a fiscal expansion in response would be a sudden rise in the 
price of imported intermediate goods that negatively affects domestic output. 
19 Statistical methods suffer from the end-point problem, that is, they are extremely sensitive to the addition of 
new data and to real-time data revisions. Structural models, on the other hand, may be difficult to implement 
consistently in cross-sectional environments and rely on the imposition of pre-determined assumptions. 
20 The IMF does not have an official method for computing potential output and every country desk decides which 
measure fits best. While the most common IMF approach uses a production function approach, assumptions vary 





context of a large sample of very heterogeneous countries (see Harvey and Jaeger, 1993; 
Cogley and Nason, 1995). Hamilton’s (20187) approach to extract the cyclical and trend 
component of a generic variable tx  (denoted t
cx  and tx
 , respectively), consists of estimating:  
𝑥𝑡+ℎ = 𝛾0 + ∑ 𝛾𝑗 + 𝑥𝑡−𝑗 + 𝑢𝑡+ℎ
𝑘





. The non-stationary part of the regression provides the cyclical component: 
 
𝑥𝑡
𝑐 = 𝑢?̂?  (9) 
while the trend is given by 
𝑥𝑡
𝜏 = 𝛾0̂ + ∑ 𝛾?̂? + 𝑥𝑡−ℎ−𝑗
𝑘
𝑗=0   (10) 
Hamilton (20187) suggests that h and k should be chosen such that the residuals from equation 
(8) are stationary and points out that, for a broad array of processes, the fourth differences of a 
series are indeed stationary. We choose h = 2 and k = 3, which is line with the dynamics seen in 
real GDP.21 
Once the output gap is obtained, we then applied to get a new measure of the cyclically adjusted 
balance. Reflecting the fact that the elasticity of government revenues (REV) to output growth 
is close to one while expenditure (EXP) is largely inelastic to growth (Girouard and André, 
2005), we multiply government revenues by the factor [1/(1+OG/100)] to get REV_adj (revenue 
adjusted), with OG being the output gap obtain via the Hamilton filter. Then CAB=REV_adj - EXP.  
3.2 Main Empirical Results  
We begin by showing the results of estimating equations (1) and (2) and obtaining (3). We 
have estimated by OLS for each country group (AE, EME, LIC) with robust standard errors 
clustered at the country level. Country fixed effects - included to control for unobserved cross-
country heterogeneity - and time fixed effects were also included - . The former are included 
to control for unobserved cross-country heterogeneity; the latter are included to control for 
global shocks. Table 1 shows the results of 𝛽𝐵𝐵, 𝛽𝐶𝐴𝐵, 𝛽𝐴𝑆 for the entire time span (1980-2015) 
as well as for sub-periods (including the post-Global Financial Crisis one). 22  
 
21 We are aware that Hamilton (20187) needs the assumption that model (8) is not affected by breaks which 
could be debatable in our sample of developing countries. 
22Applying a consistent empirical framework to heterogeneous economies inevitably exposes the analysis to 
limitations that call for appropriate nuance in interpretations. One limitation relates to data availability and 
measurement issues. Moreover, the empirical analysis relies partly on non-observable concepts—such as the 
output gap or automatic stabilizers—that are generally not estimated in a consistent fashion across countries. 
Moreover, fiscal measures may also be reflected in future budgets. For example, if accelerated depreciation is 





Looking at the first block (including all countries), the obtained coefficient estimate is 
positive and statistically significant, suggesting that in general fiscal policy has been counter-
cyclical. Moreover, counter-cyclicality seems to have been the norm throughout the last few 
decades with different strengths. Going more granular, the increase of one percentage point of 
real GDP growth leads to an increase in the budget balance of about 0.4 percentage points 
of GDP in advanced economies, 0.4 percentage points of GDP in emerging markets, and 
0.1 percentage points of GDP in low income countries. This effect comes from both the 
discretionary and automatic components (both with positive and significant coefficients). That 
being said, automatic stabilizers contribute relatively more to overall fiscal counter-cyclicality 
across income groups: around two-thirds of overall fiscal counter-cyclicality in advanced 
economies and one-third in emerging markets and low-income countries. 
While the 1990s witnessed the strongest counter-cyclical role attributed to fiscal policy 
(across all income groups), the 2000s witnessed the weakest. Not surprisingly, the degree of 
fiscal counter-cyclicality is the lowest in low income countries, where governments are 
relatively smaller and many of their functions still developing (in a Wagner’s law sense). 
Table 1: Static Setting - Fiscal counter-cyclicality estimates by income group and time 
period 
Regressor  GDP growth 
Sample / Dependent Variable Overall Balance Cyclically adjusted balance Automatic stabilizers 
Overall    
1980-2015 0.271*** 0.124**  0.147*** 
1990-1999 0.306**  0.254*   0.052*** 
2000-2009 0.136*** 0.070    0.066*** 
2009-2015 0.233*** 0.141*** 0.092*** 
AEs    
1980-2015 0.362*** 0.256*** 0.106*** 
1990-1999 0.389    0.274    0.115*** 
2000-2009 0.574*** 0.454**  0.120*** 
2009-2015 0.208    0.041    0.167*** 
EMEs    
1980-2015 0.360*** 0.132    0.228*** 
1990-1999 0.556*** 0.486**  0.070*** 
2000-2009 0.070    0.015    0.055*** 
2009-2015 0.253*** 0.166*** 0.087*** 
LICs    
1980-2015 0.098*** 0.061**  0.037*** 
1990-1999 0.090    0.042    0.048**  
2000-2009 0.060    -0.022    0.083*** 
2009-2015 -0.115    -0.196    0.081*** 
Note: Robust standard errors clustered at the country level not shown for reasons of parsimony. Country effects, 
time effects and constant term were also estimated but omitted for reasons of parsimony. *, **, *** denote 






As one might be concerned about potential reverse causality issues in estimating equation 
(1) for a panel of countries, we have re-run it using instead a system-GMM estimator.23 We 
used as instruments the two lags oflagged real GDP growth and two lags the growth rate of 
each country’s main trading partner.24 Figure A1 in the appendix presents the estimated average 
effect of fiscal counter-cyclicality for advanced, emerging and developing countries. It seems 
that our OLS-based estimates are downward biased and therefore provide a lower bound for 
the “true” degree of fiscal policy countercyclicality. More specifically, an increase of one 
percentage point of real GDP growth leads to an increase in the budget balance of about 0.52 
percentage points of GDP in advanced economies, 0.50 percentage points of GDP in emerging 
markets, and 0.335 percentage points of GDP in low income countries.25 
Next, we estimate OLS country-specific 𝛽𝐵𝐵, 𝛽𝐶𝐴𝐵, 𝛽𝐴𝑆 for each of our 84 countries.26 Results 
are summarized in the charts in Figure 1, organized by country group and showing only those 
𝛽𝐵𝐵 coefficient estimates which came out statistically significant.  It is visible the 
heterogeneity within group or between countries. For example, within advanced economies 
Greece seems to be the only one for which fiscal policy over the considered period has been 
pro-cyclical. The sign of the automatic stabilizers is positive as one would expect (and much 
larger in advanced economies relative to emerging or low incomelow-income countries). 
However, heterogeneity remains: for example, in advanced economies, while automatic 
stabilizers tend be larger for the core and Nordic European countries such as Germany, Austria, 
Norway and Denmark, they are typically small for Anglo-Saxon countries such as the United 
States, the United Kingdom and Australia. The discretionary component of fiscal policy has 
been mostly pro-cyclical in advanced economies, with the exception of Estonia, Portugal and 
Greece. Note also that there are several EMEs with a measure of fiscal counter-cyclicality close 
to (or even higher) the one of some AEs.  
Figure 1: Fiscal counter-cyclicality coefficient estimates, by country  
a) Advanced Economies 
 
23 As shown in Blundell and Bond (1998) with persistent variables instruments in levels for variables in 
differences are bound to be weak. Hence, we do not resort to the difference GMM but use the system GMM 
instead. We use the efficient two-step estimator corrected by the Windmeijer (2005) procedure. Furthermore, As 
expected, we have first order serial correlation due to the lagged dependent term and due to the fact that the 
estimator uses first differences. But this does not limit the validity of our results. We do not have second order 
residual autocorrelation. The absence of AR(2) is a necessary condition for unbiased and efficient estimates.  
24 Hansen’s J-statistic showed p-values way in excess of 10 percent supporting the list of instruments used. 
25 Instrumental variables’ Two Stage Least Squares estimates (using the growth rate in main trade partners or 
lagged output gaps as instruments) for individual countries did not yield satisfactory results. 
26 The total number of countries is based on data availability, that is, only countries with at least 21 observations 






b) Emerging Market Economies 
 
c) Low Income Countries 
 
Note: country-specific estimations by OLS of equations 1-3. Only statistically significant coefficients on the 
budget balance are shown. 
 
While the previous set of results generally suggests higher fiscal counter-cyclicality for 
AE and EMEs as groups, as the country specific estimates then illustrated, there is a high 
degree of heterogeneity across countries. In fact, looking at Table 2, the within country-group 
variation is 1.5 times larger than the between variation: the within group variation equals 0.57 
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 F-Statistic P-Value 
  Within Between     
Variables         
Overall balance 6.41 3.45 3.45 0.035 
Cyclically adjusted balance 6.40 3.46 3.43 0.036 
Automatic stabilizers 0.02 0.05 0.12 0.886 
Regressions (beta coefficients)         
Overall balance 0.57 0.38 2.31 0.106 
Cyclically adjusted balance 0.41 0.38 1.12 0.331 
Automatic stabilizers  0.17 0.04 21.62 0.000 
Note: Under the “Variables” heading we have descriptive statistics of the raw variables across all country -years 
in the panel. Under the “Rregressions (beta coefficients)” heading we have descriptive statistics of, coefficient 
estimates of “overall balance”,” cyclically adjusted balance” and “automatic stabilizers” , that is, the empirical 
counterparts of correspond to 𝛽𝐵𝐵 , 𝛽𝐶𝐴𝐵 , 𝛽𝐴𝑆, respectively. in equations 1, 2 and 3 above. 
 
We now turn to the assessment of the degree of fiscal counter-cyclicality conditioned 
on the state of the business cycle. That is, we estimate for the overall sample and each country 
group, equation 4 (again with country and time fixed effects). Results in Table 3 show that the 
overall degree of fiscal counter-cyclicality is higher during recessions, particularly in emerging 
markets; while it is generally destabilizing and procyclical in low income countries during 
economic booms. Splitting this aggregate effect into the automatic and the non-automatic 
(“discretionary”) components, the former exerts a countercyclical effect irrespectively of the 
country group, being relatively larger in advanced economies during downturns. Activist fiscal 
policy actions seem to be generally acyclical, with the exception of low- income countries 
where they are generally procyclical in expansion periods (Figure Table 35). 
Table 3: State-contingent fiscal counter-cyclicality estimates, by income group 
Regressor  GDP growth 




Sample / coefficient Recession Expansion Recession Expansion Recession Expansion 
Overall 1.154*   -0.429    0.925    -0.672**  0.229*** 0.243*** 
AEs  0.564*** 0.137    0.229    -0.17    0.335*** 0.307*** 
EMEs 1.672*   -0.53    1.452    -0.751    0.220*** 0.221*** 
LICs 0.180**  -0.25*** -0.04    -0.47*** 0.220*** 0.220*** 
Note: Estimation of equation 4. Robust standard errors clustered at the country level not shown for reasons of 
parsimony. Country effects, time effects and constant term were also estimated but omitted for reasons of 
parsimony. *, **, *** denote significance level at 10, 5 and 1% levels, respectively.  
 
 Next, we move on to the dynamic setting and the incorporation the role of expectations 
in quantifying the degree of fiscal counter-cyclicality. Computing the expression shown in 
equation 7 and regressing it against real GDP growth, yields the result displayed in Table 4. 
We include the baseline results without accounting for expectations as a memory column for 
better comparison. Whenever statistically significant, the degree of fiscal policy counter-





account. For all countries between 1980-2015, we obtain a coefficient estimate of the dynamic 
counterpart of 0.61 against a coefficient of 0.27 of the static version. This result suggests that 
expectations play an important role in shaping the stabilizing effects of fiscal policy. The 
difference is particularly striking in the case of low-income countries and during 
the 2000s. We further inspected the role of the business cycle using the dynamic counterpart 
variable (results not shown but available upon request) and we still obtained a statistically 
significant and high coefficient estimate during recessions (as opposed to an insignificant 
coefficient during expansions). 
 
Table 4. Dynamic Setting - Fiscal counter-cyclicality estimates by income group and 
time period 
Regressor  GDP growth  
Sample / Dependent Variable Overall Balance (memory) Fiscal counter-cyclicality dynamic counterpart  
Overall    
1980-2015 0.271*** 0.609***  
1990-1999 0.306**  -0.013     
2000-2009 0.136*** 0.367**   
2009-2015 0.233*** 0.392     
AEs    
1980-2015 0.362*** 0.473***  
1990-1999 0.389    0.286     
2000-2009 0.574*** 0.494***  
2009-2015 0.208    0.237**   
EMEs    
1980-2015 0.360*** 0.385***  
1990-1999 0.556*** -0.292     
2000-2009 0.070    0.296*    
2009-2015 0.253*** 0.248     
LICs    
1980-2015 0.098*** 0.927**   
1990-1999 0.090    -0.292     
2000-2009 0.060    0.796*    
2009-2015 -0.115    0.10     
Note: The dynamic counterpart corresponds to equation 7 which was regressed against real GDP growth. Robust  
standard errors clustered at the country level not shown for reasons of parsimony. Country effects, time effects 
and constant term were also estimated but omitted for reasons of parsimony. *, **, *** denote significance level 
at 10, 5 and 1% levels, respectively.  
 
In Figure 2 we can observe the individual countries’ results. For reasons of parsimony 
and also those related to data availability and overall quality of fiscal forecasts to get to 
equation 7 in non-advanced economies, only a selection of these countries is shown. For most 
countries, incorporating expectations seems to matter, as the resulting fiscal counter-cyclicality 
coefficient is larger than its static equivalent. The difference between the two is particularly 







Figure 2: Static vs dynamic fiscal counter-cyclicality by country (AE sample) 
 
Note: The static corresponds to the estimation of equation 1. The dynamic counterpart corresponds to equation 7 
which was regressed against real GDP growth. Country specific OLS regressions for those countries with at 
least 21 observations. Only those coefficient estimates statistically significant at the 10 percent level or lower 
are shown. 
 
Up until now no distinction has been made between the differentiated effects stemming 
from either demand or supply shocks on the stabilizing role of fiscal policy. Given the data 
availability, the analysis below is conducted only for the advanced economies sample and it is 
based on the estimated relationship between the overall balance and each variable of interest 
(all shocks, demand shocks only, real growth and output gap). Recall that as explained in 
section 2.3 one way to identify pure “demand” disturbances relies on the Blanchard-Quah 
method, while another simply differentiates the sensitivity of the budget balance between real 
GDP growth (which would capture a mix of both demand and supply shocks) and the output 
gap (which is expected to mirror the dynamics of temporary demand disturbances). The output 
gap used below is the one retrieved using the Hamilton (2017) filter as explained earlier. 
Looking at Figure 3, the response of the budget balance in advanced economies as a whole, is 
always higher in face of demand shocks, irrespectively of the methodology employed.  
As a robustness check (not shown but available upon request), we tested the sensitivity 
of counter-cyclicality coefficients to different measures of the output gap in a panel of 
advanced economies between 1990 and 2015. These measures rely on alternative 
methodologies to estimate potential output: (1) statistical detrending (Hodrick-Prescott filter, 
the Baxter-King filter, and the Christiano-Fitzgerald Random Walk filter); (2) estimation of 
structural relationships (the production function approach from the OECD); and estimates of 
output gaps from the IMF-WEO database. Counter-cyclicality coefficients obtained for the 
panel varied between 0.65 and 0.80. Overall, estimates of the fiscal counter-cyclicality 
coefficient were not statistically different across alternative measures of the output gap. This 




























































































































output gap whereas what matters for the estimation of the counter-cyclicality coefficients is 
the rate of change in the output gap over time. 
To confirm this aspect and dig deeper into country-specificities, we have re-estimated 
equations 1-3 using the output gap instead. Appendix Tables A1-A3 show for each country 
group (AE, EME and LIC) individual estimates using either the real GDP growth or the output 
gap as the relevant regressor. As one can see, estimates of the overall degree of fiscal counter-
cyclicality are larger when the output gap is used. Table 5 summarizes all the aggregate results 
for the entire sample and income groups. 
 
Figure 3. Fiscal Counter-cyclicality in Advanced Economies: Demand vs. Overall 
Shocks 
 
Note: Blanchard-Quah denotesdemand shocks identified using Blanchard-Quah (1989) methodology.  Business 
cycle denotesdemand shocks identified using the Hamilton’s (2017)-based measure of output gap. Coefficient 
estimates statistically significant at a 1 percent level. 
 
Table 5: Summary of key results - mean and standard deviation of relevant variables 
and estimated beta coefficients 
 Overall AEs EMEs LICs 
 Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev. 
Variables         
Overall balance -1.97 3.93 -2.12 3.42 -0.57 4.46 -2.49 2.03 
Cyclically adjusted balance -1.98 3.92 -2.13 3.40 -0.57 4.48 -2.48 2.04 
Automatic stabilizers 0.01 0.08 0.00 0.03 0.00 0.07 0.00 0.04 
Dynamic Fiscal counterpart 1.11 9.52 0.96 3.58 -1.47 6.24 1.38 12.23 
Regressions (beta coefficients)                 
Overall balance                 
Growth 0.26 0.42 0.41 0.34 0.25 0.23 0.21 0.51 
Output gap 0.35 0.58 0.71 0.42 0.37 0.70 0.19 0.50 
Cyclically adjusted balance                 
Growth 0.18 0.42 0.29 0.36 0.18 0.24 0.16 0.51 
Output gap 0.08 0.56 0.31 0.41 0.13 0.71 -0.03 0.50 
Dynamic Fiscal counterpart                 
Growth -0.55 0.96 -0.62 0.76 -0.21 0.52 -2.30 2.01 
Output gap -1.14 3.65 -0.94 0.69 -0.35 0.58 0.12 4.46 
Note: Under the regressions heading, “overall balance”,” cyclically adjusted balance” and “automatic stabilizers”  
















estimating equations 1-3. The “dynamic fiscal counterpart” corresponds to the use of the expectation augmented 
version of the budget balance given by equation 7. 
 
4. Further discussion: fiscal counter-cyclicality, government size and volatility 
 
In line with the Keynesian tradition, the budget balance tends to be countercyclical with a 
semi-elasticity to output roughly equal to the share of government expenditure in GDP. 
Economists have long argued that the growing size of governments after World War II 
contributed to greater macroeconomic stability (Blinder and Solow, 1974). Indeed, countries 
with larger governments (proxied by the share of public expenditure in GDP) seem to be less 
volatile (Figure 4,a). The reason behind this relates to the near proportionality between the 
magnitude of automatic stabilizers and government size (Figure 4,b).27 Automatic stabilizers 
are particularly important because economies are subjected to shocks and prone to volatility. 
If volatility vanishes, so does the importance of automatic stabilizers. This does not necessarily 
imply that the current fiscal stabilizers are set at optimal levels (Figure 4,d). The fact that the 
size of automatic stabilizers often reflects decisions motivated by other considerations than 
output stabilization (e.g. efficiency or equity) could also make automatic stabilization 
suboptimal (Blanchard et al., 2010). Large automatic stabilizers may also delay necessary 
adjustments to structural changes if they are associated with public spending and revenue that 
tend to reduce the flexibility of markets, especially the labor market (van den Noord, 2002). In 
addition, the smaller the elasticity of government size to output volatility, the larger the 
elasticity of automatic stabilizers (Figure 4,d). 
Figure 4. Correlations between government size, volatility and automatic stabilizers 






27 The reason why public budgets provide automatic stabilization is that governments face no liquidity constraint 
and therefore behave as infinitely lived agents engaged in intertemporal optimization. Moreover, households have 
full understanding of the constraints on their behavior (vis-à-vis the government) and have full awareness of the 






















































































































Note: the elasticities of overall balance and automatic stabilizers used in panels b) and c), correspond to 𝛽𝐵𝐵 , 𝛽𝐴𝑆 
respectively, estimated earlier for each country. Real GDP volatility is measured as the rolling 3-year standard 
deviation of real GDP growth. The elasticity of government size on volatility is the result of country-specific 
regressions of total expenditure to GDP ratio on real GDP volatility (as defined earlier). 
 
5. Conclusion and Policy Implications 
This paper has extended a large body of literature looking at the degree of fiscal policy 
(counter-)cyclicality. In the current juncture, since the ability to use monetary policy to 
stabilize output is limited (especially in advanced economies), exploiting the counter-cyclical 
potential of fiscal policy can be beneficial.  
We have relied on a heterogeneous sample of 84 countries between 1980 and 2015 to 
empirically revisit the issue by focusing on three main aspects: the role of business cycle, the 
internalization of expectations of future deficits and the separation between demand and supply 
shocks. While this paper’s results remain subject to the inherent difficulty of establishing 
causal relationships between fiscal policy variables and economic outcomes, we still believe 
to have shed new light into the topic. We found that in advanced economies, fiscal counter-
cyclicality has been the norm. In contrast, fiscal policy has not always been stabilizing in 
several emerging markets and low incomelow-income countries, reflecting partly the nature of 
their growth dynamics (essentially supply driven), and the priority given to developmental 
needs over aggregate demand management. Moreover, we found that automatic stabilizers play 
a key role in fiscal counter-cyclicality, despite substantial differences between countries.  
Furthermore, countries that use fiscal policy to stabilize output tend to do so when it is 
most effective—that is, during periods of economic slack. However, fiscal policy is generally 
not used to mitigate booms. In fact, it is instead used to counteract the operation of stabilizers 
in good times. Pursuing fiscal counter-cyclicality only in bad times can undermine public debt 
sustainability because governments fail to take advantage of stronger growth to lower deficits 
and to rebuild fiscal buffers in preparation for future downturns.  
In measuring the impact of fiscal policy on aggregate demand we also looked beyond the 
current budget balance by considering future anticipated deficits and at the level of the stock 
of public debt. Taking into account fiscal expectations increases the overall stabilizing effect 





















































































































turn they moderate the variability of output, countries willing and able to use fiscal policy as a 
counter-cyclical tool can benefit from letting automatic stabilizers play freely during both 
downturns and upturns. In fact, many international organizations’ fiscal advice is premised on 
the idea that automatic stabilizers should operate freely. When automatic stabilizers fall short 
of stabilization needs, governments could consider options to better incorporate counter-
cyclical measures into the design of taxes and transfers. Note however, that an often neglected 
downside of automaticity is that it does not necessarily yield the optimal fiscal response 
because some automatic mechanisms embedded in budgets are intrinsically destabilizing (e.g. 
indexation rules applying to wages or pensions or earmarking the proceeds from given taxes 
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Table A1: Country-by-country estimation, Advanced Economies 
















Australia 0.651*** 0.497**  0.153*** 0.869*** 0.479*   0.390*** 
Austria 0.040    -0.127    0.166*** 0.496*** 0.026    0.470*** 
Belgium 0.392    0.214    0.178*** 0.469    -0.051    0.520*** 
Canada 0.433    0.305    0.128*** 1.065*** 0.685*   0.380*** 
Cyprus 0.468*** 0.418**  0.050    0.70*   0.323    0.377*** 
Czech Republic 0.185*   0.084    0.101**  0.582**  0.192    0.390*** 
Denmark 0.215    0.015    0.201*** 1.292*** 0.702**  0.590*** 
Estonia 0.201*** 0.049    0.152**  0.150*   -0.238*** 0.388*** 
Finland 0.425*** 0.290**  0.135*** 1.258*** 0.778*** 0.480*** 
France 0.646*** 0.50*** 0.145**  0.842*** 0.312    0.530*** 
Germany 0.176    -0.071    0.246*** 0.545**  0.035    0.510*** 
Greece 0.395**  0.320    0.076*   -0.46    -0.93**  0.470*** 
Hong Kong  0.410**  0.497*** -0.086*** 0.737*** 0.739**  -0.001    
Iceland 0.678*** 0.566*** 0.112*** 0.434    0.064    0.370*** 
Ireland 1.232*** 1.181*** 0.051    0.978    0.598    0.380*** 
Italy -0.608**  -0.725*** 0.117**  0.594    0.064    0.530*** 
Japan 0.601*** 0.519*** 0.082*** 0.912*** 0.582*   0.330*** 
Korea 0.042    -0.017    0.059*** 0.257**  0.037    0.220*** 
Latvia 0.309*** 0.189*** 0.120**  0.288    -0.059    0.347*** 
Luxembourg 0.278**  0.132    0.147**  0.484**  0.014    0.470*** 
Netherlands 0.395**  0.273    0.123*** 0.767**  0.237    0.530*** 
New Zealand 0.918*** 0.833*** 0.085*   1.258*** 0.888*** 0.370*** 
Norway -0.149    -0.302    0.152*** 1.737**  1.207*   0.530*** 
Portugal 0.132    0.059    0.073**  0.129    -0.331    0.460*** 
Singapore 0.667*** 0.540**  0.127*** 0.789**  0.572*   0.217*** 
Slovak Republic 0.470*** 0.361**  0.109**  0.441*   0.071    0.370*** 
Slovenia 0.601**  0.495*   0.106*** 0.671*   0.279    0.392*** 
Spain 1.028*** 0.958*** 0.070**  1.055**  0.615    0.440*** 
Sweden 0.369    0.166    0.203*** 1.268*   0.718    0.550*** 
Switzerland 0.492**  0.360*   0.132*** 0.556**  0.186    0.370*** 
United Kingdom 0.537*** 0.40**  0.137*** 0.653*   0.203    0.450*** 
United States 0.548**  0.436**  0.112*** 0.903*** 0.563**  0.340*** 
       
Note: Robust standard errors not shown for reasons of parsimony. A constant term was included but omitted for 
reasons of parsimony. Output gap estimated via Hamilton’s (2017) filtering technique. For further details refer 







Table A2: Country-by-country estimation, Emerging Market Economies 
















Algeria 0.722    0.662    0.061*   1.946**  1.617*   0.330*** 
Argentina 0.343**  0.278**  0.065    0.476*   0.253    0.224*** 
Brazil 0.340**  0.219    0.121*** 0.263    -0.087    0.351*** 
Chile 0.493*** 0.443*** 0.049**  0.925*** 0.694**  0.231*** 
China 0.084    0.052    0.032    0.042    -0.138*   0.179*** 
Colombia 0.492*** 0.436*** 0.056**  0.304    0.086    0.218*** 
Dominican 
Republic 
0.428*** 0.377*** 0.051**  0.398**  0.258    0.140*** 
Ecuador 0.320*** 0.238**  0.083*** -0.079    -0.305    0.226*** 
Hungary -0.365    -0.478*   0.113**  -0.135    -0.605    0.470*** 
India 0.127    0.073    0.054*** 0.569**  0.387*   0.182*** 
Indonesia 0.107*** 0.052*   0.054*** 0.128    -0.032    0.160*** 
Iran 0.131    0.085    0.047**  -0.012    -0.199    0.187*** 
Kuwait 0.763    0.469    0.294    2.889*** 2.031*** 0.857*** 
Libya 0.30*** 0.027    0.273*** 0.437*** -0.237**  0.674*** 
Malaysia 0.269    0.188    0.081*** 0.450    0.189    0.261*** 
Mexico 0.074    -0.013    0.088*** 0.398*** 0.198*   0.20*** 
Morocco -0.009    -0.112    0.103*** 0.181    -0.044    0.225*** 
Oman -0.019    -0.11    0.092    -0.479    -0.94    0.461*** 
Pakistan 0.322*   0.289    0.033*   -0.535    -0.678*   0.143*** 
Philippines 0.20    0.142    0.058*** 0.589*** 0.397**  0.192*** 
Poland 0.293*   0.169    0.123*** 0.634**  0.194    0.440*** 
Qatar 0.228    0.102    0.126*** -0.01    -0.294    0.284*** 
Sri Lanka 0.219**  0.164*   0.055**  0.055    -0.113    0.168*** 
Thailand 0.343*** 0.308*** 0.036    0.766*** 0.615*** 0.152*** 
Ukraine 0.111    -0.016    0.126**  0.088    -0.34**  0.428*** 
Venezuela 0.060    -0.061    0.121**  -0.324*   -0.638*** 0.315*** 
Note: see note of Table A1.  
 
Table A3: Country-by-country estimation, Low Income and Developing Countries 
















Bangladesh -0.071*** -0.09*** 0.019*** -0.264*** -0.326*** 0.062*** 
Benin -0.423    -0.465    0.042*** -0.826    -1.009    0.183*** 
Bolivia 1.640*** 1.618*** 0.023    0.705    0.456    0.249*** 
Burkina Faso -0.158    -0.209    0.052*** 0.461    0.290    0.171*** 
Cambodia 0.329*   0.295*   0.033**  0.659*** 0.533*** 0.126*** 
Chad -0.059    -0.09    0.031*   0.221*   0.098    0.123*** 
Congo, DR 0.017    0.017    0.00    -0.17    -0.213*   0.044*** 
Congo, Rep. 1.716*** 1.605*** 0.111*** 0.549    0.238    0.311*** 
Côte d'Ivoire -0.017    -0.244**  0.227    0.240    -0.451*** 0.692**  
Ethiopia 0.080*** 0.038    0.042**  0.014    -0.136**  0.149*** 
Ghana -0.074    -0.104    0.029**  -0.312    -0.426    0.113*** 
Guinea 0.847*   0.802*   0.045*** 1.465    1.295    0.169*** 
Haiti -0.323**  ... 0.074**  -0.20    ... 0.171*** 
Kenya 0.258    0.205    0.053*** 0.367    0.194    0.173*** 
Madagascar 0.306**  0.263*   0.043*** 0.085    -0.048    0.133*** 
Moldova 0.299*** 0.191*** 0.108**  0.247    -0.136    0.383*** 
Mongolia 0.275**  0.236*   0.039    -0.295    -0.623*   0.328*** 
Mozambique 0.313**  0.267**  0.046**  0.423*   0.240    0.183*** 
Niger 0.363    0.289    0.074*** 0.579    0.415    0.164*** 
Papua New Guinea -0.18    -0.26    0.080*   0.030    -0.278    0.308*** 
Rwanda 0.161*** 0.144*** 0.017    0.051    -0.049    0.10*** 
Sudan 0.159    0.152    0.007    -0.301    -0.403    0.102*** 
Tanzania -0.288    -0.293    0.005    1.110*   0.955    0.155*** 
Uganda 0.053    0.006    0.046**  -0.553    -0.724*   0.171*** 
Uzbekistan 0.635    0.594    0.042*** 0.645    0.296    0.349*** 
Yemen 0.10    -0.001    0.101*** -0.002    -0.258    0.256*** 






Figure A1. Impact of real GDP growth on the overall budget balance, OLS vs. GMM 
(percent of GDP) 
 
Notes: Estimations include country and time fixed effects. GMM results use the growth rate of main trading 
partners and output gaps as instruments. For further details refer to the main text. Coefficient estimates shown are 
statistically significant at the 1 percent level.  
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